Codification of EC administrative procedures? : fitting the foot to the shoe or the shoe to the foot? by HARLOW, Carol
2 ?
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
The Robert Schuman Centre
Codification of EC 
Administrative Procedures? 
Fitting the Foot to the Shoe 
or the Shoe to the Foot































































































Jean Monnet Chair Papers
Harlow: Codification of EC Administrative Procedures?
Fitting the Foot to the Shoe or the Shoe to the Foot
































































































Jean Monnet Chair Papers 
27
The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion cm the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 



























































































Jean Monnet Chair Papers
Codification of EC 
Administrative Procedures? 
Fitting the Foot to the Shoe 
or the Shoe to the Foot
C arol H arlow
1995





























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Carol Harlow
Printed in Italy in September 1995 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 





























































































1. Why codify? p. 7
2. Two models of codification p. 10
a. “Principles of good administration” p. 10
b. Codification p. 14
3. Arguments against rules p. 19
4. Mandatory or directory? p. 22
5. Process, function and procedure p. 25
a. Functional analyssis: legislative, judicial, administrative p. 25
b. Direct and indirect administration p. 27
6. Conclusions p. 29


























































































This Paper is based on the Workshop “Towards a Codification of EC 
Administrative Procedures” arranged at the European University Institute, 
Florence, Italy, by Professor Renaud Dehousse with the support of the Robert 
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A well-known British Prime Minister (who incidentally paid scant heed to 
her own precept in her dealings with the public administration of her country) 
was fond of quoting the American maxim, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. This 
prompts the question whether Community administrative procedures need 
fixing. In practice, the Community bureaucracy is seen as relatively open and 
accessible, while the informality of its procedures is widely appreciated. 
Rideau, for example, in a study of administrative transparency1 in the Com­
munity, observes that “les standards de motivations et de publications sont très 
élevés dans les Communautés européennes par rapport à ceux qui prévalent 
dans certains Etats membres”. Again, the authors of a review of competition 
procedures felt able to conclude that the “rights of anyone effected by an anti­
trust decision are adequately guaranteed at a procedural level” and, of anti­
dumping procedures, that the “procedural guarantees during the administrative 
process are substantial”2. The Commission is conscious of its responsibilities 
and has recently affirmed3 that it “has always been an institution open to out­
side input”, believing this dialogue to be of value to both sides. It is the politi­
cal, rather than the administrative, side of the Community which attracts cen­
sure and the Council rather than the Commission at which criticism is 
directed, though the tangled Comitology attached to the latter receives serious 
condemnation for its lack of transparency and, it has been argued, impinges 
directly and unfavourably on citizens’ rights4.
Why then an interest in codifying Community administrative procedures 
sufficient to generate two academic conferences over the past two years5? 
Certain markers are undoubtedly present in the Treaty of European Union 
(TEU), the Preamble of which speaks for the first time in terms of “common 
citizenship”. After confirming “respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law”, it goes on to talk directly of the desire “to 
enhance further the democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions”, to
1 “La transparence administrative dans les Communautés européennes” in C. Debbasch 
(ed.) La transparence administrative en Europe (Aix-en-Provence; Ed. du CRNS) 1990, 
p. 248.
2 P. Kuypers and T. van Rijn, “Procedural Guarantees and Investigation Methods in 
European Law, with Special Reference to Competition” [1982] 2 Yearbook o f European 
Law 1, 26, 33.
3 See An open and structured dialogue between the Commission and special interest 
groups, OJ C63 p.2 (5 March 1994)
4 R. Dehousse, “Institutional Reform in the European Community: Are There Alternatives 
to the Majoritarian Avenue?” EUI Working Paper RSC No 95/4 (Florence: European 
University Institute) 1995, p. 11. See further, G. della Cananea, “Cooperazione e 
integrazione nel sistema amministrativo delle Comunità europee: La questione della 
‘comitologia’“, (1990) 40 Riv. Trim. Dir. Pub. 331.





























































































provide for decisions to be taken “as closely as possible to the citizen”, and, in 
Art B, sets itself the objective of “strengthening the protection of the rights 
and interests of the nationals of its Member States”. The TEU also goes some 
way towards settling the controversy over human rights protection in the 
EEC, by requiring the Union to respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the European Convention (ECHR).
This development has a two-fold relevance. First, reflecting the provisions 
of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, which provide for the justiciablity of issues con­
cerning the civil rights of citizens, the Commission and Court of Human 
Rights are alert to the requirements of administrative justice and “sont fré­
quemment amenées à censurer le caractère insuffîsament protecteur de la jus­
tice administrative de nombreux pays membres du Conseil de l ’Europe”6. 
Further, the Council of Europe has a longstanding interest in the protection of 
citizens against maladministration and has tackled the subject of administrative 
procedures in two Resolutions7. Clearly, the fact that the organs of the 
Convention are active in this field, impinges, if only indirectly, on Community 
law.
Secondly, the TEU merely restates an established Community position. The 
move to view procedural protection of citizens as a human rights issue was 
visible within the Community long before the Maastricht Treaty. In the first 
place - though perhaps almost accidentally - Articles 190 and 191 EEC give 
Treaty protection (not necessarily identical to constitutional status) to the obli­
gation (i) to state the reasons on which administrative decisions and regulations 
are based (ii) to issue reasoned decisions, referring to proposals or opinions 
which underlie decisions and rules and (iii) to notify administrative decisions 
to their addressees. Furthermore, as long ago as 1976, an important Commis­
sion paper on human rights8 had stated
Le citoyen ne doit pas être sans protection a l’égard des pouvoirs pu­
blics. Un noyau inviolable des droits doit lui être reconnu. C’est là un 
des éléments essentiels de l’identité et de la cohérence communautaire.
The point was underlined by Dr. Bernhardt, in a comparative study made 
for the Commission, who percipiently remarked that it was not always the 
grand rights like freedom of opinion or religion which had the greatest impact
6 M. Fromont, “La justice administrative en Europe: convergences”, in Mélanges René 
Chapus (Paris: Montchrestien) 1992, p.201. And see note 76 below.
7 Resolution (77) 31 on the Protection of the Individual in Relation to the Acts of 
Administrative Authorities (28 September 1977 and Resolution (80) 2 on the Exercise of 
Discretionary Powers by Administrative Authorities (11 March 1980), the content of 
which is further discussed below. There are further relevant Resolutions, e.g., R (86) 1 
(23 January 1986) on Data Ptoection in Social Security matters.
8 La protection des droits fondamentaux dans la Communauté européene, EC Bulletin, 




























































































on the citizen but procedural rules such as the principle of judicial recourse or 
the need for administrative action to be founded on a legal base.
Finally, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice had, before ratification of 
the Treaty of Maastricht, drawn on the ECHR to stress the importance of pro­
cedural law in protecting the fundamental rights, or “four freedoms” of the 
EEC Treaty. The Heylens case9 established as general principles of EC law, 
the principle of effective judicial protection coupled with a duty to inform 
parties to an administrative decision of the reasons for that decision. The for­
mulation suggests that the procedures themselves possess constitutional weight. 
This principle finds further expression in the celebrated Johnston case10, 
where the Court struck down an ouster clause on the ground that rights 
granted to individuals in Community law must always be the subject of a judi­
cial process.
For Schwarze11, “the Court’s reasoning may be interpreted as a manifesta­
tion of an evolution which leaves behind the initial preoccupation with admin­
istrative efficiency (mainly influenced by the concepts underlying French law) 
towards [sic] a Community administrative procedure under the rule of law”. In 
other words, the Court acknowledges the importance of procedural guarantees 
in acting as a counterweight to administrative discretion.
Schwarze is also saying that the move towards viewing at least some 
administrative procedures as a fundamental or constitutional right is reflected 
in the legal systems of some of the Member States; in other words, the 
reasoning of the Court of Justice in its latest caselaw is moving towards the 
German Rechtstaat model and away from the standpoint of French 
administrative law, often described as weighted too heavily in favour of the 
administration12. It is true that, in Germany, where fundamental rights are 
protected by the Basic Law, a right of access to the courts in cases involving 
the state is specifically included by Art 19, para 4, while Art 20 formally 
insists that the executive power is bound by statute and the law. According to 
Starck13:
Nous avons donc affaire en Allemagne à une complète constitutionnali­
sation du contexte normatif de la procédure administrative; cela signi­
fie que les droits fondamentaux et les principes mentionnés ont part à
9 C 222/86 UNECTEF V Heylens [1987] ECR 4097.
10 C222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable o f the Royal Irish Constabulary [ 1986] ECR 1651.
11 “The Procedural Guarantees in the Recent Case-law of the European Community” in 
Festschrift fo r  H.J. Schemers, 1994, p.494.
12 For a classic exposition, see, A. Mestre, Le Conseil d ’Etat, protecteur des privilèges de 
l'administration, (Paris: Librairie générale du droit français) 1974.
13 Starck, “Droits fondamentaux, état de droit et principe démocratique en tant que 
fondements de la procédure administrative non contentieuse”, REDF, numéro hors série, 




























































































la primauté de la Constitution. Ils doivent être respectés par le législa­
teur qui réglemente la procédure administrative et par l’administration 
qui l’exécute. Le citoyen partie à la procédure administrative peut 
faire prévaloir ce contexte normatif devant le tribunal administratif 
par la voie d’un recours ou devant la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale 
par la voie d’un recours constitutionnel.
Fromont, however, in an article14 describing convergence of the adminis­
trative law of the Member States, remarks of Decision No 86/224 (23 January 
1987) of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, which accords constitutional 
value to the droits de la défense, that it is “un veritable statut constitutionnel de 
la justice administrative”. Anglo-American lawyers would undoubtedly see in 
these developments a clear parallel to the “legal process” theories which have 
dominated Anglo-American administrative law in the last decades15.
To summarise therefore, we might tentatively deduce a general tendency 
both inside the Member States and at Community level to sanctify at least some 
administrative procedures as “higher law”. It is important to bear in mind, 
however, that these procedures are normally those, such as the rights of the 
defence, most closely associated with or adjunct to the expressed basis of the 
Community legal order and several of its component States in the Rechstaat or 
Rule of Law ideal.
2. Two models of codification
a. "Principles of good administration"
In Anglo-Saxon terminology, the term “rules” tends to be reserved for legis­
lation or regulation. Rules characteristically take the shape of detailed and 
precise provisions which attempt to foresee and provide for all eventualities. 
Rules are thus classically contrasted with “principles”, a term associated with 
adjudication and case law16. As Kotz has remarked17, Anglo-Saxons tend 
wrongly to conceptualize codes as stylistically uniform and comprising
14 op cit., note 6.
15 J. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (New Haven: Yale University Press) 
1985.
16 See, J. Jowell, “The legal control of administrative discretion”, [1973] Public Law 178 
and “Courts and Administration in Britain: Standards, Principles and Rights”, (1988) 
Israel L.R. 409.
17 ‘Taking Codes Seriously”, (1987) 50 Modem Law Review 1, 2 (my emphasis). See 
further, W. Dale, Legislative Drafting: A New Approach - A Comparative Study o f  





























































































“generalized statements of principle”, a misconception which probably stems 
from a view of the French Civil Code as the prototype of all codification.
There is, inside the Community, a clear trend towards codification. A ma­
jority of the Member States have codified administrative procedure, some of 
them, such as Italy and Spain18, relatively recently. The codifications are, 
however, by no means uniform in style and content. Moreover, Cassese num­
bers amongst the “uncodified” systems both France and England. Both systems 
are heavily regulated and possess at least partial codifications. In the former 
case it will be suggested that the difference is one of style rather than content.
Perhaps ironically, it is the common law systems which have shown a pref­
erence for flexible, over-arching “principles” of procedural law. Justice, the 
English arm of the International Commission of Jurists, which views its func­
tion as being to act as a pressure group for better protection of fundamental 
rights and of citizen against administration, was early in the field in proposing 
a codification of administrative procedure. In 1971, Justice published a 
report19 in which it argued that administrative law possessed a dual function. 
It was not simply a question (as this paper has tended so far to suggest) of 
giving the citizen greater protection against government in the context of 
growing, though admittedly necessary, governmental powers. It was seen as 
“equally important in any reform to encourage good administration” and to 
protect the public interest by ensuring that “any fresh remedies given to the 
citizen cannot be exploited to disrupt administration or merely to delay the 
making of effective decisions”.
With these objectives in mind, Justice proposed a “legislative framework of 
principles” as an essential prerequisite for the satisfactory development of 
administrative law. Justice proposed ten principles, designed to govern all 
administrative decisions relating to individuals and to cover all steps in the 
decision-making procedure: notice, right to make representations, fact-finding 
procedures, time-limits for decision-making, reasons, etc. The style is broad 
and general; typically, the provision governing fact-finding merely provides:
It shall be the duty of an authority in proceeding to a decision to take 
all reasonable steps to ascertain the facts which are material to the 
decision.
Thus Justice's “principles of good administration” are really no more than 
“standards”. They would not, for example, be adequate to notify a subject of 
his procedural entitlements under EC competition law. Although broadly
18 For Italy, see Act 241/1990 (and see further below). For Spain, see Law No 30 of 1992 
(26 November 1992).
19 Administration under Law (London: Stevens) 1971, pp. 2, 14. The initial proposals are 
expanded and more fully discussed in the Justice/All Souls Review, Administrative 




























































































educative, they are not much help in devising a complex administrative pro­
cess, such as the EC state aids procedures. How are facts to be ascertained? 
What rights of access to documentation is to be provided? Does the person 
affected have obligations to co-operate in the fact finding process? Enforce­
ment would thus be difficult, though to Justice this was unproblematic since - 
in common with many EC lawyers today - it was content to rely on the courts 
for amplification and enforcement.
At a similar point in time, a very similar formula was employed by the 
Council of Europe in its consideration of the relationship between citizens and 
administration. In its final Resolution20, the Council listed five essentials: right 
to be heard; access to information; assistance and representation; statement of 
reasons and indication of remedies. In 1980, two were added: publication or 
notification of policies governing discretionary decisions and the need for a 
reasoned decision in the event of deviation from existing policy. These are 
typically encapsulated in a single sentence, such as “The person concerned may 
be assisted or represented in the administrative procedure”, an uninformative 
formula which does not specify whether, for example, a right to professional 
representation is envisaged and, if so, whether legal aid would be a pre­
requisite.
In considering this type of document, the question naturally arises whether it 
affords any greater protection to the citizen than a court - especially a court as 
powerful and uninhibited as the Court of Justice. The position one takes de­
pends ultimately on one’s view of the legitimacy of judicial policy-making and 
to canvass it widely would entail a long diversion into jurisprudential terri­
tory21. It is sufficient here to illustrate the variant viewpoints by noting, on 
the one side, Schwarze’s decided preference for jurisprudence22. Stressing the 
role of the Court in harmonisation, Schwarze concludes that it
has been able to integrate different principles into the Community’s 
legal order and it has been particularly successful in finding an appro­
priate synthesis between common law and continental European stan­
dards... the development should, at least in my opinion, stay in the 
court’s hands and not be turned over to legislation, at least not in the 
sense of a fully-fledged codification of administrative law.
20 Resolution dealing with the Protection of the Individual in Relation to the Acts of 
Administrative Authorities, above, note 7.
21 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth) 1967; Law ’s Empire 
(London: Fontana) 1986. For the Court of Justice, see H. Rasmussen, On Law and 
Policy in the European Court o f Justice. A Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking 
(Martinus Nijhoff) 1986.




























































































Judge Due, on the other hand, in a lecture discussing the rights of the 
defence23, has hinted that the time may have come for codification. His 
reasoning is the converse of Schwarze’s: since codification has become the 
norm in Member States, harmonisation would be assisted.
Three arguments are normally advanced in favour of codes. The first con­
cerns legitimacy, allocating the normative function to the legislature. The 
argument notably omits to say what is to happen in the case of legislative iner­
tia. In the case of the Community, troubled with serious problems of “demo­
cratic deficit”24 but with a court which sees its mission as the creation of a 
principled body of constitutional law 23 and accustomed to see its rulings 
observed, this argument is hard to advance. It is made harder by the presence 
in some Member States of Consitutional Courts which play at least a quasi­
legislative role26
The second argument, which concerns legal certainty, contends that rules are 
clearer and less ambiguous than jurisprudential principles. But we have so far 
been discussing a code of the type which establishes standards to be fleshed out 
in case law. Such codes invite the intervention of the judge. This prompts the 
question whether the policy-making instincts of the judiciary can be curbed by 
greater specificity and, if so, whether this has any relevance to the question 
(discussed below) of optimum format for codification of Community adminis­
trative procedures.
The third and weightier argument involves subject matter. Judges undoubt­
edly suffer from a professional deformation which inclines them to approach 
the administrative process with trial procedure as their ideal-type. It is suffi­
cient in this context to point to the extent to which the rights of the defence 
and the principle of access to a judicial tribunal have been prioritised by both 
the Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights. I have argued elsewhere27 
that the Court of Justice has been altogether less sympathetic to the rights of 
access necessary for democratic participation in rulemaking. Similarly, a pas­
sage from the well-known Heylens judgement28 hints at the possible attitude of
23 “Le respect des droits de la défense dans le droit administratif commun” 23 Cahiers de 
droit européen 383, 396 (1987).
24 Dehousse, op. cit. And see generally, J. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” 100 
Yale U  2403(1990).
23 F. Mancini, “The Making of a Constitution for Europe”x (1989) 26 CML Rev 595; F. 
Mancini and D. Keeling, “Democracy and the European Court of Justice” (1994) 57 
MLR 175; G. Slynn, Introducing a European Legal Order, The Hamlyn Lectures 
(London: Stevens) 1993.
26 See further, “Judicial Politics in Western Europe”, 15 (3) West European Politics 
(Special Issue, Volcansek ed) (1992); “The New Constitutional Politics of Europe”, 26 
(4) Comparative Political Studies (Special Issue, Shapiro and Stone eds) (1994).
27 C. Harlow. “Towards A Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice” (1992) 12 
YEL 213. And see further below.




























































































the Court to reasoned decisions in the absence of legislative signal in Art 190 
EEC. Heylens, it will be remembered, had been prosecuted on the basis of a 
finding of non-equivalence of qualifications as a football trainer by a commit­
tee which gave no reasons for its decision. The Court reasoned that workers
...must also be able to defend [their rights] under the best possible 
conditions and have the possibility of deciding, with a full knowledge 
of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in applying to the 
courts. Consequently, in such circumstances the competent national 
authority is under a duty to inform then of the reasons on which its 
refusal is based, either in the decision itself or in a subsequent com­
munication made at their request.
What the Court seems to be saying is that the right to reasons is simply one 
of the rights of the defence, dependent on the right of access to a court29.
To summarise once more, the procedural rights protected by courts are 
usually individual in character and biased inevitably towards judicial proce­
dures, a point discussed further below. The codified, general statements 
espoused both by Justice and the Council of Europe are, in sharp contrast, 
advantageous in being written primarily from the standpoint of the good 
administrator. Yet even here both remain largely individuated in character, 
premissed on a relationship between a single individual and a corporate state. 
Neither contains any requirement of consultation nor any other provisions 
with respect to rulemaking nor, indeed, any reference to collective citizen 
action or group rights.
b. Codification
There may be a distinction between the use of the term “code” to indicate a 
system of general principles and “codification”, describing a collection of 
regulatory material dealing with the same subject-matter. To put this 
differently, codes can be seen primarily as a convenient way to index and 
articulate connected and inter-locking rules30.
There is certainly scope for codification of the untidy, though highly regu­
lated, English system. The Tribunals and inquiries Acts of 1958 and 1971 are 
partial codifications in the first sense which, since they are notably incomplete, 
do not really satisfy the second usage. The Supreme Court Act 1981 is a con­
solidation of the procedures for judicial review. Unfortunately, however, it is 
neither a code nor a codification being only partial, and leaves the judges to
29 See to the same effect, M. Shapiro, “The Giving of Reasons Requirement” (1992) Univ 
o f Chicago Legal Forum 179.
30 See, Matticella, “La codification du droit: réflexions sur l’expérience française 
contemporaine” 10 Revue française du droit adm inistratif 1994.668. And see, 




























































































construe two texts which cover the same ground but are not identical31.Again, 
in the area of access to government information, England possesses, in addi­
tion to the Official Secrets Act 1989, a Data Protection Act 1984, the Access to 
Personal Files Act 1987, the Access to Individual Reports Act 1988 and the 
Access to Health Records Act 1990. Since several began as Private Members 
Bills, none is complete in itself. Other statutes, such as the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990, contain important provisions on access, while the posi­
tion is further complicated by reliance on “soft law”, in the form of a Code of 
Practice policed by the Parliamentary ombudsman32.This position is simply 
indefensible.
Although France has a “roll on” codification programme, the French Com­
mission supérieure de codification is not in too great a hurry to “codify” the 
procedural rules for the contentieux adm inistratif. It may be that they are 
seen as already codified in the sense of being complete in themselves or, on the 
other hand, it may be recognised that further simplification would be counter­
productive. This was certainly the experience of the English Law Commission, 
when it set out recently to “rationalise” the arrangements for appeal from 
administrative tribunals to the High Court. In its Working Paper, the Com­
mission considered two ways forward: either (i) it could make proposals for a 
detailed, rationalised general codification, allowing for exceptional cases; or 
(ii) it could develop a number of model procedures to serve as precedents 
when new procedures were introduced or old ones reformed, a project leading 
in the long term towards simplification and rationalisation. The second 
approach received some support from the more experienced Council on Tri­
bunals, which had been working towards a codification of tribunal procedure 
for ten years34. In the end, however, the Law Commission abandoned all 
attempt at rationalisation, accepting that sectoral appeal procedures varied too 
greatly for standardisation to be appropriate35. In comparing this uncodified 
system with that of France, the reader must remember that the French 
procedural code covers a unitary set of administrative tribunals and not, as in 
England, a disparate body of specialist tribunals, ultimately answerable to the 
ordinary courts. We might conclude that the second model more closely
31 See, for the consequences, R v Dairy Products Tribunal ex p. Caswell [1990] 2 AC 738.
32 See, White Paper on Open Government, Cm 2290 (1993) noted P. Birkinshaw, ‘“ I only 
ask for information’ - the White Paper on open government” [1993] Public Law 557. See 
generally, R. Austin, “Freedom of Information: The Constitutional Impact” in J. Jowell 
and D. Oliver, (eds.) The Changing Constitution (Oxford: Clarendon) 3rd edn 1994; P. 
Birkinshaw, Freedom o f Information: the law, the practice and the ideal (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson) 1988.
33 See, “La relance de la codification” 5 RFDA 1989.303. The code is contained in Loi 79- 
587 (11 July 1979) and published in the Dalloz Code administratif.
34 See, Council on Tribunals, Models Rules o f Procedure for Tribunals, Cm 1434, 
(London: HMSO) 1991.
35 Compare the Consultation Paper, “Remedies in Administrative Law”, Law Com No 126 
(London: HMSO) 1993, p. 115 with the Final Report, “Remedies in Administrative 




























































































resembles the Community situation, where a specialist, agency-style 
administration with access to good legal advice undertakes a narrow range of 
activities and is answerable to powerful courts of high calibre.
The Italian Law 241/1990 could best be described as a “halfway house”. 
General in character, it is administration oriented, forming an integral part of 
the Ciampi Government’s programme for administrative reform. At the time, 
there was apparently widespread dissatisfaction with the “opacity” of both leg­
islative and administrative procedures and the “modest performance of most 
public services”. Thus the Law was specifically put in place with a view to 
improving the administrative ethos, making it less introverted and more user- 
friendly36. Its “prudent” objective was to dignify Italian administration with a 
number of general principles, to identify particularly meaningful procedures 
and to shorten leisurely administrative proceedings. It was hoped that adminis­
tration would thus be rendered more transparent and more accountable. We 
should not, however, make the mistake of thinking that Italian administrative 
procedure can be compressed into this handful of articles; the Law contains 
express provision for secondary legislation which could take the form either 
of more detailed horizontal provision (e.g., a code of data protection) or 
detailed vertical provision (e.g, a code of planning procedure). Thus the clos­
est parallel to the Italian model is probably that of the American Administra­
tive Procedures Act (APA), a “residual” statute which applies only when no 
other federal statute specifically provides procedural rules for a particular 
kind of governmental action and when the specific enabling statute is silent on 
the point37.
Discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the German and Italian codifica­
tions, Cognetti advances a more general argument concerning the effects of 
over-regulation. Rules frequently produce effects entirely contrary to those 
desired, fuelling conflict and leading to obstructionist attitudes on the part of 
the administration. Procedure is ossified and experiment and innovation 
blocked. In short, the impact of codification on administrative conduct is not 
always propitious; there are often significant behavioural costs in terms of 
bureaucratisation38. In the EC context, for example, it is by no means certain 
that the open Commission attitude, helpful in providing access to less powerful 
interest groups, will survive the rationalisation of access procedures (described 
below) which is presently taking place. The administrator, fearful of die judge
36 G. della Cananea, “Reforming the State: The Policy of Administrative Reform in Italy 
under the Ciampi Government”, Discussion Paper No 37 (Oxford: Nuffield College 
Centre for European Studies) p.5. See also, S. Cassese, “Le système administratif italien 
ou l’art de l’arrangement” 67 Rev. française d ’administration publique 339 (1993).
37 On the operation of which see, “The Administrative Procedure Act: A Fortieth 
Anniversary Symposium” 72 Virginia Law Rev 215-492 (1986).
38 S. Cognetti, “Normative sul procedimento, regole di garanzia ad efficienza” (1992) 40 
Riv trim, di diritto pub. 94, 96. The locus classicus is M. Crozier, Le phénomène 




























































































or hierarchical superior over his shoulder, holds tenaciously to the rulebook in 
the knowledge that the least deviation may have serious costs in the shape of 
litigation, cost, delay and even disciplinary action. If, in the majority of 
administrative law systems, courts cannot substitute their policies for those of 
the administrator, they can ensure that unpopular policies are put on to the 
back burner for ever because the cost of doing again what has been done 
incorrectly is too great.
Ensuring administrative change is diffcult, entailing as it does radical 
changes in bureaucratic ethos and codification of administrative procedure 
may not be the best way forward. The British “Citizens’ Charter”39 approach, 
geared to clear and simple targets, performance indicators and managerial 
monitoring, may in the long run be more effective. A similar preoccupation 
with the twin goals of administrative effectiveness and service to citizens led 
France in 1992 to adopt a “Charte des services publics”. This charter, 
however, adopted the more conventional technique of enunciating “principles 
of good adminstration” - including here fashionable notions of transparency, 
accountability, clarity and accessibility - linked to recourse through the 
principle of access to an (administrative) court40.
The best example of codification is in fact the German Adminstrative Proce­
dures Code41. This mammoth piece of legislation represents a systematic 
attempt to codify large areas of administrative activity. This, on the one hand, 
appealed to the German ethos, which views administration as a mere executant 
of the law. On the other hand, such an ambitious project was probably only 
possible because of the high quality of German administration. The effect 
according to one observer42 has been to transform the administration into a 
sort of “court of first instance” with the administrative jurisdictions as Court 
of Appeal. This is not an outcome which everyone would see as desirable43!
In the modern world, everything points to the inevitable predominance of 
this style of codification. Writing about developments in the civil law, Irti has 
described44 a process of “decodification”, a term which he uses to describe the 
way in which the general law of contract has been supplemented by statutory 
provision to deal with standard form and consumer credit contracts. Irti
39 The Citizens' Charter, Cm 1599, 1991 (London: HMSO). For discussion, see, A. 
Barron and C. Scott, “The Citizens’ Charter Programme” (1992) 55 MLR 526, 529-532.
40 Conseil d’Etat, Rapport Public 1994 (Paris: La documentation française) 1995, p. 111.
41 Enacted 25 May 1976, published Bundesgesetzblatt 29 May 19761.1253
42 Cognetti, op. cit.. p.l 17.
43 e.g., S. Rabin, “Some Thoughts on the Relationship between Fundamental Values and 
Procedural Safeguards in Constitutional Right to Hearing Cases” 16 San Diego Law Rev. 
301 (1979). See also, J. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice (1985).
44 L ’età della codificazione (Milan: Giuffrè) 1979 cited Kotz, op. cit. note 17, p.13. The 





























































































argues also that “decodification” represents the response of the legislator to the 
situations of rapid economic, political, societal and, in particular, technological 
change to which we are becoming accustomed - and to which, incidentally, the 
foundation of the European Communities is itself a political response. He con­
cludes that the policy-loaded legislation used to implement consequential legal 
change, alien though it is to the basic philosophy of the codes, will gradually 
supersede the codes and transform them into residual law to be resorted to 
only if no more specific provision can be found. Atiyah’s conclusion is 
similar45: the process is inevitable. “Legislation, even when fleshed out by 
detailed subordinate regulation, simply cannot anticipate and provide for the 
great variety of cases which are likely to occur”.
Shapiro reminds us that this move will not be without effect on the courts, 
arguing that technological change inevitably weakens the position of a review­
ing judge46. This is one explanation of the move to instal “general principles” 
at the constitutional level. In Hauptzollamt München v Technische Universität 
München47 duty was payable on a Japanese scanning telescope imported by the 
University. The Hauptzollamt had first nil rated the machinery but later 
changed its decision in reliance on a Commission decision. Pointing out that 
this was an area of technical expertise in which the case law restricted review 
to manifest error of appreciation, the Advocate General nonetheless urged the 
Court to intervene. The Court agreed to review the fact-finding process on the 
ground that “respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order 
is of even more fundamental importance” than the Commission’s power of 
technical appraisal. Only an adequately reasoned decision, based on a careful 
examination of the facts and properly communicated to the party affected 
would fulfil the Commission’s procedural obligations. In the event, the Court 
annulled on the ground that the committee of experts consulted by the Com­
mission could not be shown to be sufficiently expert. Lurking behind the fid- 
getty procedural ruling, one senses the Court’s discontent with the substantive 
decision; the inference is that it felt that a “manifest error” had indeed been 
made. To quote Shapiro, “judges will accept plausible reasons only for those 
outcomes that are reasonable”48
45 “Common Law and Statute Law” (1985) 48 Modern Law Review 1, 5. And see, R. 
Livock, “Science, Law and Safety Standards: A Case Study of Industrial Disease”, 
(1979) 6 J. o f Law and Society 172.
46 “Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage” 92 Yale Law J 1487, 1507 (1983). And see, 
P. Schuck, “The new ideology of tort law” 92 The Public Interest 93 (1988)
4^ C 269/90 Hauptzollamt München v Technische Universität München [1991] ECR I- 
5469.




























































































3. Arguments against rules
Thus far, arguments for codification have been expressed largely in terms of 
the classic legal paradigm; the emphasis, in other words, has been on values 
such as fairness and legal certainty. Important though these are, other views of 
the administrative world exist whose values have so far been minimised. 
Baldwin has argued49, that lawyers are inclined to
take too much for granted that justice is an agreed, unproblematic, 
apolitical bench-mark. Not only may “justice” mean different things to 
different individuals or groups but it is arguable that governmental 
processes should serve other values beyond those encompassed in such 
a term.
Politicians and policy-makers may prioritise different objectives, notably 
administrative efficiency and the need to get things done.
This viewpoint has been taken further by the British administrative lawyer, 
Gabriele Ganz50, whose perspective is primarily that of a regulator and anti­
capitalist. Basing her argument on the antipathy shown by British courts both 
to inquisitorial procedure and to regulatory agencies more generally, Ganz 
contends that judge-made principles of administrative procedure inevitably 
veer towards the tried and tested judicial procedures of any given society. 
Ganz instances the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), whose pro­
cedure has been subjected to sustained criticism centred on “the inquisitorial 
nature of the proceedings” and covering: private hearings; the absence of 
rights of cross-examination; the ill-defined nature of the “charges”; and the 
dual role of the MMC as “judge and prosecutor”. Ganz concludes that the bias 
towards trial-type procedure has here resulted in procedures which
combine the worst of both worlds. Its procedure is not judicial enough 
for a quasi-criminal hearing but too judicial for a fact-finding body...
The criticisms of [its] procedure show the difficulties of combining 
judicial safeguards with an investigatory procedure.
Similar criticism could certainly be addressed to some of the caselaw of the 
Court of Human Rights^.
49 “Governing with Rules: the Developing Agenda”, in G. Richardson and H. Genn (eds) 
Administrative Law and Government Action (Oxford University Press) 1994, at p. 160. 
51* Administrative Procedures (London: Sweet and Maxwell) 1974, p.23, in reliance on the 
parliamentary debates.




























































































The example of monopolies and mergers chosen by Ganz is especially rele­
vant to our subject-matter, since anti-trust or competition proceedings form 
the core of the Single Market programme and entail both overlap between 
national and EC competencies and also close collaboration between national 
and EC authorities. Formidable as this grouping sounds, it is important to 
consider whether the big guns are always and only at the disposal of the 
administration52. Experience shows that insistence on precise conformity with 
every detail of administrative procedure can be extremely stultifying. Con­
sider the land use planning procedures of any national state. The importance of 
the hallowed property rights at stake, which demand and usually receive the 
highest level of judicial protection, combines with the crucial importance of 
sensible land use to the national economy and the intervention of environmen­
tal considerations to produce a clash between public and private interests in 
which resolution is inevitably controversial53. Detailed procedural regulation 
of the planning process actually embodies a series of hard-fought political bar­
gains. Trying to push the bargains further, or operating altogether outside the 
bargain, to which they may not be parties, the well-resourced and well- 
informed environmental movement, whose interest often lies in preventing all 
development, can turn the complexity of planning procedures to good account. 
(I shall not stop to exemplify)54. A process of de-regulation then begins, in 
which the authorities respond by removing certain developments entirely from 
the planning process; by substituting less complex procedures; or even by 
resorting entirely to negotiated and bargained positions. To translate this from 
national to EC level, British environmental groups have made excellent use of 
EC requirements for environmental impact assessments to challenge or delay 
planning decisions taken at national level, on several occasions provoking an 
angry response from government55.
Partly for such reasons, studies of the use of rules in administration prove 
conclusively that it is one thing to introduce rules and quite another to see 
them implemented56. In the European Community, where administration is 
typically indirect and execution is in the hands of the administrations of the 
Member States, a double problem of compliance inevitably arises; at one level, 
the rules may not be transposed into national legislation while, at the second.
52 For a striking example, see Adams v Commission (No I)  (1986) 1 CMLR  506, a 
confidentiality case where the Commission failed miserably to protect its informant 
against a multinational pharmeceutical company.
53 P. McAuslan, The Ideobgies o f  Planning Law (Oxford: Pergamon) 1988; “The role of 
courts and other judicial-type bodies in environmental management” 3 J o f Env Law 
(JEL) 195 (1991). And see, S. Tromans, “Roads to Prosperity or Roads to Ruin? 
Transport and the Environment in England and Wales” 3 JEL 1 (1991).
54 But see, R. Camwarth, “The planning lawyer and the environment” 3 JEL 57 (1991).
55 Twyford Parish Council and others v Transport Secretary 4 JEL 274 (1992). And see, C.
-—-.Harlow and R. Rawlings, Pressure Through Law (London: Routledge) 1992, Chap 6.




























































































they are not implemented57. Schwarze58, who is a firm supporter of judicial 
values and control, points to the “very complex” and “detailed and technical” 
system of rules and regulations’ governing agriculture, leading to substantial 
non-compliance in “at least some” of the Member States. For this reason, 
Schwarze notes a “trend towards simplification and especially alignment of the 
type of rules in force”.
In areas such as environmental or consumer law, where the States are often 
unwilling to take strong action, much Community regulation remains a dead 
letter or depends for enforcement on interest and social action groups59. They 
may either trigger Art 169 infringement proceedings or take action on their 
own behalf in national courts. Although this type of action is normally 
addressed at substance rather than procedure, breaches of procedural law may 
be used as a peg on which to hang substantive complaints. The Bureau 
européen des consommateurs (BEUC) has, for example, fought several actions 
to secure access to Commission documentation and to secure a right to be con­
sulted both in rulemaking and individual decisions69.
In monopolies and anti-trust regulation, which forms the core activity of the 
Community, the actors are also usually “repeat players”61: on one side, multi­
national corporations, well versed in the use of legal techniques, on the other 
the Commission. The result is the “Eurolaw saga”62, where each procedural 
requirement is used as a step in a bargaining game, resulting in prolonged liti­
gation in national courts and the Court of Justice. In Kirklees BC v Wickes 
Building Supplies63, an English local authority brought proceedings to enforce 
the terms of the Shops Act 1950, which prohibits Sunday trading. The defen­
dants asked for an “undertaking in damages” to cover their estimated profits if 
the case were ultimately to be lost by the local authority. The English Court of 
Appeal, implementing the rule of Community law that effective protection 
must be given in cases of directly effective Community rights, ruled that no
57 F. Snyder, “The Effectiveness of Eurpean Community Law: Institutions, Processes, 
Tools and Techniques” (1993) 56 MLR 19. See also, R. Baldwin and T. Daintith, 
Harmonization and Hazard: Regulating Health and Safety in the European Workplace 
(London: Graham and Trotman) 1992.
58 op. ciL, [1993] PL 229, 235.
59 Snyder, op. cit.; S. Krislov, H. Ehlermann and J. Weiler, “The Political Organs and the 
Decision-making Process in the United States and the European Community” in M. 
Cappeletti, M. Seccombe and J. Weiler (eds) Integration Through Law (vol 1 (Berlin: de 
Gruyter) pp. 61-85; L. Kramer, EEC Competition Law (Deventer: Kluwer) 1986.
69 See note 86 below.
61 M. Galanter, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change” 9 Law and Soc Rev 95 (1974).
62 C. Harding, “Who Goes to Court in Europe? An Analysis of Litigation against the 
European Community” (1992) 17 EL Rev 105.
63 [1990] 1 WLR 1237 (CA). The ruling was subsequently (and sensibly) reversed by the 
House of Lords: [1992] 3 All ER 717. For comment, see R. Rawlings, “The Eurolaw 




























































































interim injunction would be granted without such an undertaking. The sums of 
money involved were such as the enforcement agents, local authorities, were 
simply not in a position to underwrite. In consequence, the Shops Act, though 
never invalidated by the Court of Justice, became a dead letter64.
We should not underplay these sociological arguments. “Law-games” are a 
symptom of an increasingly litigious society, already reflected in logistical 
problems for the Community legal systems and causing serious problems in 
the shape of a mounting docket not entirely resolved by the creation of, and 
extensive delegation to, the Court of First Instance. We are all familiar with 
the arguments for a “new architecture”, allowing for the creation of 
alternative fora and an appellate jurisdiction for the Court of Justice65 of 
which one commentator has significantly remarked that the appeal rights are 
“likely to be taken up by most undertakings in competition cases who fail at 
first instance”66. Art 177 reference procedure is also incapable of stemming 
the flow of cases to the Court and may, indeed, have added to corresponding 
problems of delay and overload at national level.
4. Mandatory or directory?
National courts have all developed their own juridical techniques to circum­
vent this type of problem. Some use a “mandatory/directory” classification to 
dispense with procedural failures which are seen as negligible, (e.g, where 
adequate notice has been given and the applicant is aware of the terms of the 
decision, though the precise format required by statute or regulation has been 
disregarded). Similarly, a distinction may be drawn between penal and admin­
istrative regulation to exclude the rights of the defence in some administrative 
processes. A “void/voidable” distinction is also common in administrative law.
Schwarze has argued67, partly relying on the Technische Universität case68, 
that the Court of Justice is averse to this type of compromise, stressing its 
insistence on “the strict conformity of the decision-making process to procedu­
ral requirements” and the “willingness of the court to insist on strict obser­
vance of the rules of administrative procedure”. We have already noted the
64 The response of the Court of Justice to Sunday trading litigation suggests that it is alert to 
such dangers, moving to strengthen the national legal order: See, Cases 267, 268/91 
Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097. For comment, see J. Steiner, Textbook on EC 
Law (London: Blackstone) 4th edn 1994, pp. 103-4.
65 J-P Jacqud, J. Weiler, “On the Road to European Union - A New Judicial Architecture: 
An Agenda for the Intergovermental Conference” 27 CMLR 192 (1990).
66 J. Shaw, European Community Law (London: MacMillan) 1993, p.73.
67 op. ciL, [1993] Public Law 229, 231-2.




























































































Court’s obvious discomfort with the substantive decision here and it must be 
said that a second case also cited by Schwarze involves a gross breach of pro­
cedure, hard for any court to overlook. The French Ministry of Industry had 
issued a permit for the disposal of nuclear waste without consulting the Com­
mission, mandatory under Art 37 EAEC. The day after suit was filed in the 
Strasbourg administrative tribunal, the Commission was consulted and replied 
inside the time-limit of 6 months. Questioned as to whether consultation must 
precede the authorisation rather than the start of disposal, the Court naturally 
approved the former interpretation69! The British Eurospace case discussed 
below seems inconclusive.
Judge Due believes the Court is more flexible70:
Il ne faut pas considérer ces différentes formules comme la preuve 
d’une indulgence de la part de la Cour à l’égard des irrégularités com­
mises par la Commission, mais plutôt comme l’expression d’un souci 
de ne pas annuler, pour des irrégularités non substantielles des déci­
sions dont le contenu est pleinement justifié et qui devraient donc être 
reprises après une reouverture éventuelle de la procédure admi­
nistrative.
The statements can in fact be reconciled if we look at a well-known group of 
cases concerning the rights of the defence in competition law71. On the basis 
of Art 14 (3) of Reg 62/17, the Commission had taken a series of decisions 
ordering the applicant undertakings to submit to investigations concerning a 
price-fixing ring in the distribution of polyethylene. Most cooperated under 
protest, though Hoechst did not, so that a judicial warrant was obtained. After 
comparing national procedures, shown to diverge greatly, the Court of Justice 
followed a jurisprudence constante72 to hold that the rights of the defence are 
in principle “fundamental” in character, including a right to a reasoned deci­
sion as “essential indicators” of the Commission’s approach. The Court went 
on, however, both to hold that the possibility of contesting the validity of the 
Commission’s decision before it and applying for suspension was a sufficient 
protection for the undertakings and also to reject all the specific procedural 
complaints (such as signature by a single Commissioner rather than the Com­
mission as a whole). This recalls the earlier Nold decision73 where it was said 
that regard must be had to the “objectives of general interest” pursued by the 
Commission.
69 C l 87/87 Saarland v French Ministry o f Industry [1988] ECR 5037.
70 op. cit., p. 392.
71 Hoechst v Commission Cases 47/87, 227/ 88 [1989] ECR 2859; Dow Benelux v 
Commission C85/87 [ 1989] ECR 3137; Dow Chemicals Iberia v Commission Cases 87- 
99/87 [1989] ECR 3165; Orkem v Commission C374/87 [1989] ECR 3283.
77 San Michele v Commission [1962] ECR 449; National Panasonic v Commission 
C l36/79 [1980] ECR 2033.




























































































A similar technique was used in Enichem74, where Directive 380/87 EEC 
required Member States to notify the Commission before regulating to restrain 
the use of non-biodegradable packaging. The validity of a commune’s byelaws 
was questioned. Advocate General Jacobs made a comparison to procedures 
under Directive 189/83 to argue that notification was directory rather than 
mandatory. The Court, however, preferred to rule that there was an obligation 
to communicate but that failure to do so did not either invalidate the byelaws 
nor create any interest enforceable by individuals75. Similarly, in the Scottish 
Football Association case76, where the applicants complained of dispropor­
tionate and peremptory procedure by the Commission in failing to answer 
their letters and then moving suddenly to threaten penalties under Art 11(5) 
EEC 17 for non-compliance with Commission procedures, the CFI refused to 
annul. It went out of its way to remark that the applicant’s own conduct could 
not be regarded as “active cooperation with the Commission” but rather “as a 
polite but explicit refusal to cooperate”:
In those particular circumstances, the Commission was under no obli­
gation either to pursue lengthy informal correspondence or to engage 
in oral discussions with the applicant, which had provided only part of 
the information requested. It was entitled to proceed to the second 
stage of the preliminary investigation procedure, involving a request 
for information by way of a decision, and that step cannot be regarded 
as excessive.
This case law is notable for the Court’s realistic appreciation of the true 
nature of competition procedures and the Commission’s difficulties in imple­
mentation. It is interesting to note, however, that there may be a danger that 
the more legalistic attitudes of the Commission and Court of Human Rights 
may produce a clash between the jurisprudence of the two courts77.
74 C380/87 Enichem v Municipality o f Cinisello Balsamo [1989] ECR 2491.
75 Compare the stricter attitude of the French Conseil d’Etat in Association Force Ouvrière 
Consommateurs CE 9 July 1993 Rec. 212 (annulment of non-reasoned decision); Union 
des transporteurs en commun de voyageurs des Bouches-du-Rhône (UTCV) et autres CE 
Ass 11 March 1994, 10 RFDA 1994.1004 concl. du Marais (annulment of regulation 
promulgated without consultation of EC Commission).
76 C T-46/92 Scottish Football Association v Commission (9 November 1994).
77 See especially, Funke v France [1993] 15 EHRR 297, noted with other, similar 
jurisprudence from the Court of Human Rights at [1993] EL Rev 465, 468 where A. 




























































































5. Process, function and procedure
The emphasis of this paper has so far been on the stylistic merits and demer­
its of various forms of code, while the nature of the administrative process has 
received only cursory consideration. Contemporary rulemaking theory sug­
gests, however, that for rulemaking to be successful there must be a “good fit” 
between objectives and the regulatory technique selected. Baldwin78 mentions 
three main functions for rules - though his list does not pretend to be all- 
embracing - which are (i) to instruct officials; (ii) to encourage consistency 
and (iii) presentationally, to enhance the perceived legitimacy of decisions. 
Unfortunately, this crucial question of “fit” is often subordinated to political 
ends: for example, “soft law” may in practice be a more effective way of 
securing a certain goal79, yet the rulemaker may prioritise legitimacy, causing 
him to turn to “hard law”. If the codification of Community administrative 
procedures is to be more than a symbol, we need to tailor it carefully to the 
needs of administration.
Considered from the viewpoint of the administrative lawyer, the European 
Community is atypical. Its administration is small, centralised and elite. Its 
activities are, to say the least, one-sided, largely confined to the economic 
sector. Much of the subject-matter of modem administrative law which 
impinges most directly on the citizen - tax, welfare, housing and immigration - 
lies outside the competence of the Community and it is national administrations 
which possess the executive function. This pattern makes the Commission 
comparable to a single, generalist, American-type regulatory agency, or per­
haps a number of specialised regulatory agencies. Usually, as with the 
enforcement of the Single Market, the “agencies” are represented by the 
different directorates of the Commission, more independent than national 
ministries, hence more like a regulatory agency in their operation. The picture 
may come to resemble the United States still more closely if the establishment 
of new, autonomous agencies, such as the European Environmental Agency80, 
becomes an accepted precedent.
a. Functional analysis: legislative, judicial, administrative
The classical typology of administrative function and process derives from 
separation of powers theory. To take the obvious example, jurisdiction in 
French administrative law is governed by the presence of an acte administratif. 
In classic Anglo-American administrative law, adjudication (or decision-mak­
ing) and administration (often confused with or classified as discretion) are
78 Baldwin, op. cit. note 48, p. 159.
79 Snyder, op. cit., note 56.





























































































again distinguished. In practice, this has led to strong protection of individual 
interests through the steady subjection of adjudicatory/individuated decisions 
to the concept of “due process” and to the trial-type procedural protections 
associated with adjudication81. More recently, the area of administrative dis­
cretion has been eroded by requirements of transparency: for instance, the 
formulation of reasons and open expression of policies as rules, a dangerous 
process which may create entitlements in the shape of “legitimate 
expectations”, whether substantive or of legal process is not yet clear82. Rule- 
making procedures, previously relatively exempt, have also begun to be 
formalised. Transparency has led to demands for formal rights of consultation 
and participation, strongly protected by a jurisprudence built on the American 
Administrative Procedures Act83. The lesson from America is, however, that 
the interface between these supposedly separate areas of administrative activity 
is highly problematic, creating a substantial cost in the shape of litigation and 
delay84.
There is inevitably considerable overlap between the categories of adminis­
trative activity, which most political scientists would in any case view as facets 
of a single function85 and, as yet, the Commission’s output functions remain 
primarily policy-formation and rulemaking. Nor is the classic, functional 
analysis strongly marked in Community law. This may be primarily due to the 
wording of Art 189 EEC, which treats the power to make regulations and 
directives and individual decisions in the same paragraph. In contrast, the 
restrictive requirement of “direct and individual concern” for standing to sue 
under Art 173 EEC has had the effect of introducing an embryonic functional 
distinction, seen at its worst in the “Fruit and Vegetables” cases86 which forbid 
recourse against decisions in the shape of a regulation. Arguably, the Court’s 
jurisprudence is generally weak in dealing with group or collective rights. It 
has refused to annul regulations on the ground that they made no room for 
consumer groups to make representations in anti-dumping procedures and has 
paid scant attention to third-party interests in competition cases87. Only 
recently has it begun to encourage interest groups, fighting for space in the
81 Galligan, op. cit., pp. 355-60.
82 P.P. Craig, Administrative Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell) 3rd edn 1994, pp. 293-6 
and “Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis” (1992) 108 LQR 79.
83 R. Pierce, S. Shapiro, P. Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process (Westbury, New 
York: Foundation Press) 2nd edn, 1992, pp. 35-6. And see, Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v Volpe 401 US 402 (1971).
84 The fullest exposition is perhaps by W. Gellhom, C. Byse, P. Strauss, Administrative 
Law, Cases and Comments (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press) 7th edn 1979, Ch 
3.
85 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson) pp. 130-1.
86 Cases 16, 17/62 Confédération Nationale des Producteurs de Fruits et Légumes v 
Council [1962] ECR 471.
87 C 170/89 BEUC  v Commission [1991] ECR 5709; T37/92 BEUC and NCC  v 




























































































policymaking process. Indeed, it is fair to see the Commission as in advance of 
the Court88.
Admittedly, the Community lawmaking procedure is complicated enough, 
without wishing to add to the complexities. On the other hand, it notably lacks 
legitimacy. One aspect of the lack of trust lies in the absence of those collective 
procedural rights associated with rulemaking strongly developed and protected 
by American administrative law; there is, for example, no “notice and com­
ment” procedure89. Consultation requirements routinely involve only the 
Commission or Member States. Provision for non-parliamentary representa­
tion is corporatist in character, envisaged solely in terms of the EcoSoc and 
Comitology, whose procedures can scarcely be described as either transparent 
or accessible90. Without wishing to take the Community down the blind alley 
of functional analysis, a development already presaged by the prolix jurispru­
dence on “proper legal basis”, there is clearly room for a more thoughtful 
treatment of rulemaking procedure.
b. Direct and indirect administration
A more pertinent way to classify Community administrative acts is into 
“direct” acts (where the Community administration impinges directly on the 
subject) and “indirect” (when its function is to regulate, harmonise, coordinate 
and influence national administrations). It is important to bear in mind here 
that, although the Community’s activities can be loosely grouped as 
“economic”, they in fact differ sharply in character. What they have in com­
mon is that the subject-matter characteristically involves difficult economic 
judgements and is highly technical. Again, although the actors in a competition 
process may differ greatly from those in the area of state aids, dominated by 
the Member States or anti-dumping procedures, where third-party states and 
parties are most likely to be found, a common feature is that the subject of 
direct Community action is always more likely to be a corporation than an 
individual citizen91. We have already noted92 in the context of competition 
procedures that the Court is aware of the special problems this creates for the 
Commission. Again, we have seen its willingness to match procedure and 
party, for example, by holding that to wait 26 months before taking a decision 
on state aid is a breach of the principle of confiance légitime but, on the other
88 See C26/76 Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co v Commission (No 1) [1977] ECR 
1875 and for a critique, Harlow, op. cit. note 27.
89 See K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (St Paul: West Publishing) 3rd edn 1972, 
especially pp. 140-142.
90 K. Bradley, “Comitology and the Law: Through a Glass, Darkly” (1992) 29 CML Rev 
693.
91 For confirmation, consider the caselaw already cited and see the analysis of litigants in 
Harding, op. cit. note 61.




























































































hand, that the principle can be relied on only by third parties and not the 
Member States93.
In this context, the primary purpose of rules is neither to instruct Commu­
nity officials, mainly well-advised and expert in their field nor, given the 
relatively small volume of decisions, to encourage consistency. The primary 
concern of the different sectoral actors is clearly to understand their rights and 
entitlements in the administrative process, a need which entails a high degree 
of specificity. In practice, this is precisely how Community regulation of 
administrative procedures has evolved. It is typically activity-specific, with 
procedural and substantive provisions often contained in a single code. To 
choose examples at random, we know already that Art 14 of Council Regula­
tion 62/17 specifies the procedure to be followed in investigating breaches of 
the competition rules; similarly, the procedures for export of cultural goods 
are contained in Regulations 89/594 and 91/447.
Sectoral studies show, however, that the formal provisions of Community 
law are often underpinned by a complex web of “soft la w ”9 4 : the circulars, 
directives, guidelines and guidance which increasingly form the fabric of 
national administrative law. This is particularly true of state aids, where a 
situation has developed in which the Treaty procedures are too complex to be 
effectively used by the Commission, while the regulatory powers granted by 
Art 94 EEC have never been used because of the opposition of Member 
States95. Not surprisingly, the Commission has stepped in to fill the legal 
vacuum with a mix of individuated decisions, “framework” guidelines, codes 
of conduct, codes of practice. Their use raises all the legal problems associated 
with “quasi-legislation” in national legal systems: its binding nature, legality, 
enforcement, publication in the Official Journal, availability to parties 
affected, and so on. It is this confusing web of regulation, with its implications 
for arbitrariness and opacity, which cries out for rationalisation and a measure 
of codification - as della Cananea, in his detailed study, in fact concludes96.
Yet in these highly regulated areas, a German-style general codification is 
neither practical nor desirable; indeed, consolidation even of apparently simple 
matters, such as the time within which letters must be answered or decisions 
taken, would be hard to achieve. This does not mean that there is no room at 
all for “horizontal” or generalist codification but simply that it too ought to be 
subject-specific. Some such provisions already exist, such as the new proce­
dures for access to information already mentioned; the rules governing the
93 C223/85 RSV Maschinefabrieken v Commission [1987] ECR 4617; C5/89 Commission 
v Germany [1990] ECR 1-3437.
94 Snyder, op. cit., note 56.
95 M. Struys, “Questions choisies de procédure en matières d’aides d’Etat” 29 Rev trim du 
droit eur 17,24.
96 “Administration by Guidelines: The Policy Guidelines of the Commission in the Field of 




























































































provision of information of a technical nature set out in Directive 83/189; or 
the draft directive on data protection which contains provisions concerning the 
right to access personal data files. In time these could be collected and pub­
lished together, as with the public procurement directives.
Turning to the areas of indirect administration where the Community is 
reliant on national actors, rather different considerations obtain. On the one 
hand, there is a strong argument that procedure is consitutionally a question 
for Member States. It would follow that it would be highly inappropriate and, 
indeed, directly contrary to the principle of subsidiarity now strongly rein­
forced by Arts A(2) and B TEU, for the Community to intervene directly with 
any general codification. Arguably, the Court of Justice has already shown 
itself too prone to intervention in procedural matters, basing its encroachment 
on Art 5 EEC97. On the other hand, the high degree of decentralisation which 
permits Member States, whose standards and practices are by no means always 
similar or even compatible, to act as agents for the Community in a wide 
divergency of processes and situations, ranging from licensing, subsidy or the 
establishment of agricultural, fish or transport quotas, to the administration of 
welfare and immigration services, makes such a move particularly desirable. 
Lack of harmonisation creates an unacceptable degree of inequality in which 
the European citizens receive markedly different treatment from the diverse 
administrations of the various Member States. Here it would be both appro­
priate and possible for the Community to provide a lead in establishing 
“bottom-up” standards of good behaviour: in other words, to maximise or 
“level up” Community practices. Presentationally, such a move could logically 
be connected to the Commission’s general desire to “maximise” or “level up” 
in human rights matters98.
6. Conclusions
The thrust of this paper has undoubtedly been against a full-scale codifica­
tion of EC administrative procedures based (eg) on a German prototype. This 
is just as well, since there is no political momentum for such a measure, a 
point strongly illustrated in the state aids sector where we saw movement
97 See, E. Garcia de Enterria, “The Extension of the Jurisdiction of National Administrative 
Courts by Community Law: the Judgement of the Court of Justice in Borelli and Article 5 
of the Treaty” (1993) 13 YEL 19, a comment on C 97/91 Oleificio Borelli v Commission 
[1993] ECR1-6313. The arguments can be compared to those surrounding the legitimacy 
of the direct effect doctrine: see especially, D. Curtin, “The Province of Government: 
Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Law Context” (1990) 15 EL 
Rev 195.




























































































blocked by the fact that the regulators were also the regulated. K ram er99 , 
speaking from years of experience of EC consumer policy, reproaches Mem­
ber States with similar lack of political will to embark on “legal integration”, 
the necessity of which was first suggested by Lando in 1978. Suggesting a 
compromise of “framework rules” to establish general principles of product 
safety, he warns that “the problems normally begin with the details”.
Yet although it seems to run counter to the universal trend towards complex 
legislation, the argument for a codification of “general principles of good 
administration” is a strong one. Cotterell has recently pointed to the conse­
quence for legal systems of the increasingly opaque and confusing image of 
legality in modem societies. Like Irti, he argues for rationality, urging an 
enhanced effort to re-assert the core values of reason and consistency in 
law 100. A Community Code or Charter of Good Administration would 
reinforce basic administrative standards within national administrations and, at 
the same time, clarify and fortify the twin images of legality and good 
administration in the public perception.
Some of the proposed standards will already have been accepted by Member 
States in their capacity of members of the Council of Europe and are not likely 
to prove especially controversial. Again, a majority of Member States is famil­
iar with the concept of codified administrative procedures. There are Treaty 
precedents in the shape of Arts 190 and 191. A European Ombudsman, the 
normal monitor of administrative procedures, was put in place by Arts 8d and 
138e TEU101. We also have the new transparency provisions urged by 
Denmark, anxious at the prospect of a watering down of their own excellent 
procedures102. In the wake of the Edinburgh summit of 1992 came the wel­
come publication of a number of measures designed to improve transparency, 
in particular a proposal for “Green papers” and a Code of Conduct concerning 
public access to documents103.
Yet one can sense in parallel a contrary climate of opinion that the state has 
ceased to be the real enemy. The modern “robber barons” are the 
multinational companies with whose depredations both state and Community 
have insufficient arms to deal. There is concern at the absence of adequate 
regulation of financial markets. There is concern at the inability of standard 
criminal procedures - conforming to the adjudicative paradigm on which 
administrative procedure is based104 - to conclude cases of serious fraud with
99 EEC Consumer Law (Deventer: Kluwer) 1986, pp. 382, 384.
100 “Law’s Community: Legal Theory and the Image of Legality”, 19 J. o f Law and Soc. 
405, 409.
101 See, Statute of the European Ombudsman, OJ LI 13 (4 May 1994).
102 Intergovernmental agreements on Democracy, Transparency and Subsidiarity, EC Bull 
12/1992 p.7 (11/12 December 1992). See also, EP Resolution A3 0356/93.
103 O7L340 (31 December 1993); 07146/58 (18 February 1994).




























































































any measure of success. There is less concern over the public monopoly of the 
multi-media and more concern over the private monopolies accumulated by 
“media barons”. A desire for more stringent regulation with less protection 
for perceived “villains” runs counter to a wish for less “red tape”.
At the political level, the battle for deregulation is well under way. Adminis­
trative procedures are notably costly in an era when all governments see a 
need to curtail public expenditure. Other national governments, and even the 
Community, may be tempted by the precedent of the British Deregulation and 
Contracting Out Act 1994, which permits the Government to dismantle leg­
islative provisions which place too great a burden on industry without the need 
to resort to Parliament. Conscious of the dangers and anxious to protect the 
public service ethos from rapid deregulation and dismantlement, France has 
been nudging the Commission to prepare a European Charter of Public 
Service105. The Charter would protect a minimum level of public service, as 
well as some administrative procedures of a type which fall within the scope of 
this paper: for example, “transparence vis-a-vis des usagers et participation, ou 
partenariat de ceux-ci”. To this list the Commission would add others, espe­
cially the cherished proportionality principle. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
project has received support from six of the Member States.
This initiative can be related to moves by the European Parliament which, in 
a 1993 resolution, invited the Commission to present a proposition defining 
“minimum standards” for public services throughout society. The Commis­
sion’s response, though less ambitious than the original French sponsors 
wanted, is seen as encouraging. The draft Constitution for the European Union 
projected by the European Parliament106 also catalogues as human rights some 
guarantees of fair administrative procedures, notably protection against 
surveillance in the absence of judicial warrant, a right of access to personal 
administrative files and a right of access to courts. It seems that there might be 
a considerable measure of support for an agenda item at the next intergovern­
mental conference proposing a Code or Charter of administrative procedure. 
Whether agreement could be secured over the contents and modalities is, how­
ever, much less certain.
105 Conseil d’Etat, Rapport annuel 1994, op. cit., pp. 111-116.
106 See Report of the Herman Committee, EP Doc. A3-0064/94. The Catalogue forms Title 
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